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States have the power to ban cultural defenses under the police
powers doctrine. However, any attempt to ban the use of Sharia as a
cultural defense presents a serious problem. Because Sharia is a
religious doctrine, any statute regulating Sharia must survive scrutiny
under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. As a result of
Supreme Court precedent, states are only permitted to ban the use of
Sharia as a cultural defense if the statute is neutral and of general
applicability. This Comment analyzes Awad v. Ziriax, in which the
United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma struck
down an amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution barring the use of
Sharia in courtrooms. This Comment then proposes a statutory solution
that would survive First Amendment scrutiny, allowing states to ban
Sharia as a defense to criminal offenses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a scenario that could keep a majority of citizens in Oklahoma
awake at night.' The prosecutor has put together a strong case, and there
is no question that the defendant, on trial for murder, has committed the
crime. The case is given to the jury, which quickly returns a guilty
verdict. This monster will be put away for his crime. His punishment
seems imminent. Then, in a remarkable turn of events, the judge gives
the defendant new life. During sentencing, the judge invokes the
defendant's culture to diminish the defendant's sentence so that it does
not involve jail time. The defendant receives a minor slap on the wrist,
and he is free to strike again.2
While perhaps overly dramatic, the preceding illustration
demonstrates a scenario that legitimately concerns people in many
states.3  Courts have not established a uniform definition of what
constitutes a "cultural defense."4  However, Black's Law Dictionary
defines the term as either: (1) "a criminal defendant's assertion that
because an admitted act is not a crime in the perpetrator's culture or
native land, it should not be judged by the laws of the place where it was
committed"; or (2) a "defense that the actor's mental state at the time the
alleged crime was committed was heavily influenced by cultural
factors.",5 Under these two definitions, a cultural defense can be used as
1. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (noting that
an amendment banning consideration of Sharia and international law passed with 70% of
the vote).
2. One such case where a cultural defense was invoked to mitigate an otherwise
guilty defendant's sentence is People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
2, 1988). For further discussion of Chen, see infra text accompanying notes 16-17.
3. See Donna Leinwald, More States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, USA TODAY
(Dec. 9, 2010, 10:29 AM), http://usat.ly/OFy2WK (noting that six states in addition to
Oklahoma have enacted laws or drafted proposals to ban Sharia or other cultural
defenses).
4. Taryn F. Goldstein, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American Criminal
Justice System Formally Recognize A "Cultural Defense"?, 99 DICK. L. REv. 141, 144
(1994).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (9th ed. 2009).
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a complete defense to an alleged crime or as a means to negate the mens
6rea element of a crime.
Although courts have been dealing with cultural defenses since
185 1,7 the use of Sharia as a cultural defense has only recently emerged
to the forefront of public debate. 8 Sharia has become a hot-topic issue
both at the local level and in nationwide elections. 9 Former Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich recently called for federal legislation aimed at
limiting the use of Sharia in courts.° Additionally, if recent events are
any indication of the future,"1 the debate regarding the place of Sharia in
American society may have only begun.
The first major challenge to a law banning Sharia as a cultural
defense in courtrooms occurred in Awad v. Ziriax. 1 2 Awad concerned an
amendment to Oklahoma's Constitution. 13 In Awad, the court issued a
preliminary injunction against Oklahoma amendment State Question
755, which would have prohibited state courts from considering Sharia
and international law when deciding cases. 14 The court in Awad found a
strong showing that State Question 755 violated both the Establishment
6. See Jisheng Li, The Nature of the Offense: An Ignored Factor in Determining the
Application of the Cultural Defense, 18 U. HAW. L. REv. 765, 767 (1996) (stating that use
of the cultural defense is not always to exculpate but rather to cancel mens rea).
7. See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 145.
8. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010:
Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 320-21 (2011) (stating that
legislators in six states have recently proposed legislation to ban consideration of Sharia
in some form).
9. See Leinwald, supra note 3.
10. See id.
11. See Karen Zraick, Ground Zero Mosque Opened to the Public Wednesday,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 22, 2011, available at http://bit.ly/nmXzUs (discussing
the uproar over plans to open a Mosque near the World Trade Center site).
12. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301-02 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
13. See id. at 1298 (discussing the history of State Question 755, which was the
proposed amendment that would ban Sharia as a cultural defense).
14. See id at 1308. State Question 755 read:
This measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that deals
with the courts of this state. It would amend Article 7, Section 1. It makes
courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases. It forbids courts from
considering or using international law. It forbids courts from considering or
using Sharia Law.
International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the conduct
of international organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states
and tribes. It deals with their relationship with each other. It also deals with
some of their relationships with persons.
The law of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources
of international law also include international agreements, as well as treaties.
Sharia Law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal sources, the Koran and
the teaching of Mohammed.
Id. at 1301.
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and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.15
The intention of Oklahoma voters in banning Sharia as a cultural
defense via State Question 755 may be better understood after examining
an instance in which the cultural defense was used in New York. In
People v. Dong Lu Chen,'6 Chen killed his wife with a hammer after
learning that she had been having an affair.17  Chen then invoked a
cultural defense, claiming that he was driven to murder because of
traditional Chinese values. The judge agreed.18 Chen received only five
years' probation for his crime, 19 even though he was facing a prison term
of 5 to 15 years.20
Given the outcome in Chen, Oklahoma voters may be justified in
their concerns over allowing defendants to invoke cultural defenses to
crimes. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the court's ruling in
Chen may have even encouraged violence against other women in the
community. 21 Therefore, by passing State Question 755, Oklahoma
voters may have intended to eliminate an easily identifiable cultural
defense for their own safety.
This Comment will illustrate why cultural defenses should have no
place in our justice system, at least in criminal cases. While there are
many arguments against the use of cultural defenses,22 this Comment
will discuss only two that are commonly advanced.23  First, cultural
defenses provide an excuse for a small minority of people that is not
available to the average person. Indeed, the majority of the population is
held to the maxim that "ignorance of the law is no excuse. 24 Second, a
primary goal of our justice system is deterrence.25 Recognizing a
cultural defense does not promote deterrence.26 By failing to punish
defendants because of their culture, society may be encouraging others of
15. See id. at 1306-07.
16. People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1988).
17. See id.
18. See Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Woman and the "Cultural
Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 64 (1994).
19. See id. at 64.
20. See id at 64 n.26.
21. See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 161.
22. See id. at 158.
23. See id. (stating that the recognition of a cultural defense would imperil fairness
and deterrence, two of the most compelling goals of the justice system).
24. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 161.
25. See id. at 160.
26. See id.
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the same background to engage in illegal activities with little
27repercussion.
Although this Comment will argue for limitations on cultural
defenses, including Sharia, states must be careful not to attack specific
religious groups. Because of the unique nature of Sharia,28 any
regulation on its use in courtrooms will have to withstand First
Amendment scrutiny. 29 This Comment will address the question of
whether a law that targets cultural defenses, but has the effect of
burdening religious practice, can survive First Amendment scrutiny.3 °
In exploring why the amendment in Oklahoma was struck down,
Part II will introduce Sharia and examine the effects that a ban might
have on Muslim citizens.31 In Part III, this Comment will analyze the
reasons the Awad court gave for striking down State Question 755.32
Part III will argue that the Awad court correctly applied Supreme Court
precedent33 because Oklahoma formulated State Question 755 in such a
way as to single out Muslims for detrimental treatment,34 excessively
entangling government and religion. Lastly, Part III will argue that the
Oklahoma amendment was not neutral, of general applicability, or
supported by a compelling state interest.
Part IV will suggest a statutory solution, allowing states to ban the
use of cultural defenses such as Sharia in courtrooms without violating
the First Amendment. Part V will examine a proposed bill in
Pennsylvania and discuss the various constitutional challenges that the
bill may face. This Comment will conclude in Part VI by arguing that
27. See id. at 161 (quoting a Chinese woman saying that the lenient sentence in Chen
led to her husband threatening her with violence).
28. REX AHDAR & NICHOLAS ARONEY, SHARI'A IN THE WEST 3 (2010).
29. The First Amendment has two clauses dealing with religion: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or [2] prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. Most traditional cultural defenses do not have to clear this hurdle because most
cultural defenses are based on a defendant's experiences in his native cultural
environment. However, in terms of Sharia, it may be difficult to separate cultural
defenses from religious defenses because they often overlap. Nonetheless, it is not
essential to make the distinction for this Comment's purposes.
31. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
32. For example, Muslims rely on Sharia for purposes other than defense at trial,
such as for drafting wills and testaments. See id. at 1305-07; see also Part II.B.
33. See Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971) (holding that Establishment Clause was
violated by state giving aid to church-related institutions); Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79
(1989) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated by the enforcement of a
neutral and generally applicable criminal prohibition); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause was
violated by ordinances that were neither neutral nor generally applicable).
34. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
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states may be able to pass laws banning cultural defenses that would
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is Sharia?
The definition of Sharia is subject to a variety of interpretations.35
The term itself appears only once in the Qur'an.36 The root of the word
Sharia means "the way," or an understanding of scriptural sources to
determine "how to be a Muslim."' 37 On the other hand, many jurists
think of Sharia as Islamic law38 derived from the Qur'an and the
Sunnah.3 9
Muslims use Sharia for matters other than defense at trial. For
example, Awad claimed that State Question 755 would effectively void
his last will and testament.4 0 Because Awad's last will and testament
was based partially on the teachings of Mohammed, it would fall under
the umbrella of Sharia according to State Question 755. As a result,
Awad's will would likely be banned from probate,41 disrupting both the
burial method and distribution of assets that is required by his religious
beliefs.42
While Sharia is used interchangeably with Islamic Law,43 and is
commonly referred to as Sharia law, Sharia is distinct from "law" in the
traditional sense. The plaintiff in Awad testified, and the court agreed,
that Sharia is a set of religious beliefs that provide guidance without
imposing legal obligations.4 4 Sharia imposes not legal obligations but
"obligations of a personal and private nature dictated by faith. '45
Accordingly, any law seeking to regulate Sharia is automatically thrust
into First Amendment domain.




39. Sunnah is the "body of traditional social and legal custom and practice of the
Islamic community." Sunnah Definition, BRITANNICA.COM, http://bit.ly/JkWFpV (last
visited Oct. 16, 2012).
40. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
41. Id. at 1307.
42. The plaintiff explained that his religion directs him to donate a certain amount of
money to charity after his death and directs him to be buried in a particular manner. See
P1.-Appellee Resp. Brief at 28, Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir. 2011).
43. AHDAR & ARONEY, supra note 28, at 3.
44. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
45. Id.
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B. Constitutional Considerations
Because a large majority of voters enacted State Question 755, 4 6 it
is necessary to discuss in what cases a federal court may override the will
of voters. In Cantwell v. Connecticut,47 the U.S. Supreme Court applied
the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.48  In 1947, the Court also extended the
protection of the Establishment Clause to the states. 49  After the
extension of the religion clauses, a state may no longer block a person's
free exercise of religion.50 While State Question 755 may have been the
will of an overwhelming majority of Oklahoma voters, it nevertheless
has to meet the minimum floor of protection set by the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses. The judiciary must ensure that constitutional
rights are protected, even if that means striking down a popular provision
of a state constitution. 51
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence regarding
religion varies according to the clause involved. First, there is the
Establishment Clause, which states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. 52  The seminal case dealing
with the Establishment Clause is Lemon v. Kurtzman.53 Lemon involved
two statutes, one from Pennsylvania and one from Rhode Island, that
were challenged under the Establishment Clause for providing taxpayer
money to church-related elementary and secondary schools.54 The Court
created a three-part test for determining when a law violates the
Establishment Clause. 55 The Court then used this test to declare both
statutes unconstitutional.
56
46. See id. at 1302.
47. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
48. See id. at 303 (finding that states are prohibited from violating the Free Exercise
Clause in the same manner as the federal government).
49. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1947) (holding that taxpayer
funds could be used to pay for busing of students to parochial schools without violating
the Establishment Clause).
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. But see ELLIS M. WEST, THE
RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2011) (arguing that the First
Amendment religion clauses were meant to guarantee states' freedom from federal
government interference with such rights).
51. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958) (stating that desegregation would
continue in Arkansas in the face of opposition by state officials because the federal
Constitution is the supreme law of the land and every state legislator and executive is
bound to support it).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
54. See id. at 606.
55. The three-part test says, "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
2012]
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However, Lemon has been maligned since its inception.57 Although
the Court has not consistently applied Lemon to Establishment Clause
cases,5" it has not overruled the decision either.59 Constitutional scholar
Erwin Chemerinsky suggests that Establishment Clause cases are often
decided on a particular justice's theory of interpretation. 60 Three basic
theories of interpretation exist: (1) strict separation,
61 (2) neutrality, 62
63and (3) accommodation.
Complicating matters further, the Supreme Court has limited Lemon
to instances in which the law being challenged is not facially
discriminatory. 64 If the law is facially discriminatory, meaning that it
favors one religion over another, then strict scrutiny applies, and the state
must prove a compelling government interest.65 For example, in Larson
v. Valente,66 the Court struck down a Minnesota law that imposed
registration requirements on charitable organizations but did not impose
such sanctions on religious institutions if they received at least half of
their financial support from their members.67 The Court stated that this
requirement was "precisely the sort of official denominational preference
that the Framers of the First Amendment forbade. ' '68
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
56. See id. at 615.
57. Justice Scalia, in his entertaining concurrence, compared Lemon to a "ghoul in a
late-night horror movie" that refuses to die. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992) (using a coercion test to declare
clergy-led prayer at graduation as unconstitutional); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
672 (1984) (holding nativity scene on government property constitutional); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (holding that government may pay for a legislative
chaplain).
59. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859-60 (2005) (applying Lemon in
its entirety).
60. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1192 (3d
ed. 2006).
61. Id. at 1192.
62. The neutrality approach entails applying an endorsement test to see whether the
government practice equals an endorsement or disapproval of religion. The Justices
disagree as to whether the test is whether it should be applied from the perspective of a
well-educated and informed observer or whether it should look to the perceptions of a
reasonable passerby. Id. at 1195.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1200.
65. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (striking down a Minnesota law
that imposed registration requirements on certain charitable organizations because there
was no compelling state interest). Strict scrutiny is the most intensive level of review the
Court uses. Under strict scrutiny, a law will be upheld only if the government can show a
compelling interest for the law. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 541.
66. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
67. Id. at 255.
68. Id.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently used the
Larson test to affirm the district court's decision in Awad.69 The court
never reached the point of analyzing State Question 755 under Lemon
because it reasoned that State Question 755 discriminated facially among
religions and should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 70 The court pointed
out that Sharia was the only religious doctrine mentioned in the
amendment.71 Moreover, the court said that the violation of rights under
State Question 755 was arguably more flagrant than the violation in
Larson because the law at question in Larson did not name any specific
religion. Having determined that State Question 755 was facially
discriminatory, the court then analyzed whether the amendment at issue
furthered a compelling government interest.73 The court concluded that
there was no such interest because the state could not prove that Sharia
had ever been used in Oklahoma courts. 74
The history and application of the Free Exercise Clause is more
defined than that of the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court was
initially reluctant to use the Free Exercise Clause and rejected pleas to
apply it in numerous situations. 75  However, in 1990, the Court
fundamentally changed Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence with its
decision in Employment Division v. Smith.76 In Smith, the Court held
that the Free Exercise Clause could not be used to challenge a neutral
law of general applicability. 77 The Court upheld a law banning the use of
peyote because it applied to everyone and did not single out Native
Americans because of their religion.78 The Court also said that strict
scrutiny would not apply to neutral laws that were generally applicable
even if they burdened religion.79 Instead, such laws would be subject
only to rational basis review.
80
69. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128 (10th Cir. 2012).
70. See id. at 1128.
71. Seeid. at 1129.
72. See id at 1128.
73. See id at 1129-30.
74. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 (10th Cir. 2012).
75. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986) (holding that there is no
religious exception to the requirement that welfare recipients provide social security
numbers); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990)
(holding that religious group is not exempt from sales and use tax on religious materials).
76. CHEMERrNSKY, supra note 60, at 1257.
77. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 888.
80. See id. at 879 ("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law that the state is free to regulate.").
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In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,8' however, the
Court struck down a number of ordinances that banned animal sacrifice
because they targeted only one religious group. 81 The target of the
ordinances, the Santeria, was a religious group based in Florida, and
animal sacrifice was a traditional part of its teachings.83 When the group
formed a church in 1973 for the purpose of practicing the Santeria faith,
the City of Haileah held an emergency public session and decided to pass
enactments and resolutions banning animal sacrifice.8 4 The ordinances
made numerous exceptions for other religious groups and were tailored
to ban only sacrificial killings by the Santeria. 85 The Court held that,
because the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable,
they had to further a compelling state interest, which they failed to do.86
Consequently, the Court considered the ordinances overbroad or
underinclusive because they did not attempt to achieve their objective
with the analogous nonreligious conduct.87
Based on Smith and Lukumi, a law that is neutral and of general
applicability has to undergo rational basis review; by contrast, a law that
on its face is directed at a specific religious practice will be subject to
strict scrutiny. 88 Once strict scrutiny is applicable, the government must
show a compelling state interest for the law to be upheld.89
C. History of State Question 755
On November 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters approved an amendment to
the state constitution, State Question 755, which would ban courts from
considering or using Sharia and international law. 90 The amendment
would also ban Oklahoma courts from applying the laws of any other
state that allowed consideration of Sharia, even though courts would still
be free to look to other states that considered international law. 91 Two
days later, the plaintiff, Muneer Awad, filed suit in federal court
asserting that the ban on consideration of Sharia violated the
81. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
82. Id. at 524-25.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 525-28.
85. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 536.
86. Id. at 545-46.
87. See id. For example, although stating that the purpose of the ordinance was to
prevent animal cruelty, the ordinance failed to ban other conduct such as fishing or
euthanasia of stray animals. Id. at 543-44.
88. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 1261.
89. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
90. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010)
91. See id. at 1306.
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Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
92
Awad asked the court to issue a preliminary injunction against the
amendment's enactment.
93
The district court agreed that State Question 755 violated both the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 94 The
court reasoned that the amendment violated the Establishment Clause
because "its primary effect was to inhibit religion" and that the
amendment would involve excessive government entanglement with
religion because it would require judges to determine the content of
religious doctrines. 95 In addition, the court found that the amendment
violated the Free Exercise Clause because it singled out Sharia and was
not backed by a compelling state interest.
96
III. ANALYSIS
Part III will now examine why State Question 755 violated both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
A. Establishment Clause
97
Out of the three approaches to Establishment Clause questions, the
district court in Awad applied the neutrality theory.98 The district judge
also used the endorsement test in conjunction with the three prongs of the
Lemon test. 99 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's endorsement test assesses
a government practice to determine if it constitutes an endorsement or
disapproval of religion. 100 Under the Lemon test, State Question 755
would be unconstitutional if it had the purpose or effect of "conveying
the message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
92. See id. at 1302.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1306-07.
95. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-07.
96. Id. at 1307.
97. The analysis here concerns the Lemon test, meaning that the amendment is
assumed to not differentiate among religions on its face. This Comment applies the
Lemon test to more robustly examine the constitutional analysis in Awad. The Tenth
Circuit exclusively used the Larson test in its analysis and did not remand the case to the
district court. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1126-30 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying the
Larson test and holding that the amendment did not serve any compelling government
interest).
98. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (2010) (using Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test).
99. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
100. Some Justices use an endorsement test under the neutrality theory. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 1194 (discussing the endorsement test with respect to
the neutrality theory); see also supra text accompanying note 62.
20121
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preferred."' ' The government's actual purpose would not matter;
instead, the test focuses on the result. 102 The amendment would also be
unconstitutional if it involved an excessive government entanglement
with religion. 10 3  According to the Supreme Court, a law entails
excessive government entanglement if it involves a "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance."'' 0 4  Although the
district judge in Awad did not discuss the purpose prong of the Lemon
test in her analysis, this Comment will conclude that the amendment also
violated that prong.
1. The Effect Prong
To determine whether a law lacks a primary effect that "neither
advances nor inhibits religion,"'0 5 courts look at the law through the eyes
of the reasonable observer.'o 6 The district court in Awad concluded that
the Oklahoma amendment's primary effect was to inhibit religion.1
0 7
The court rejected the state's contention that the amendment was a
choice of law provision and noted that the language of the provision
singled out Sharia.10 8 The amendment specifically addressed only one
religion: Islam. 109  Such singling out of Islam constituted a specific
attack on Awad's faith." 0 The legislative history of State Question 755
made it clear that the amendment was exclusively targeting Sharia. 1
While the state might contend that statements of the legislators should
not be considered, Justice O'Connor's reasonable observer would be
101. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 1194. But see Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987)
(stating that, for the effects prong to be violated, the government itself has to advance
religion).
102. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
103. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
104. Id. at 619.
105. Id. at 612-13.
106. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the government action should be judged
through the eyes of a reasonable observer).
107. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
108. Id.
109. State Question 755 read, in pertinent part, "This measure amends the State
Constitution.... It forbids courts from considering or using international law. It forbids
courts from considering or using Sharia law." Id. at 1301.
110. The amendment explicitly mentions Islam twice; both the text of the amendment
and the statement of purpose mention Sharia law. See id. at 1298.
111. State representatives from Oklahoma made clear that the amendment was aimed
at Sharia, See Brief of the Am. Jewish Comm. as Amici Curiae Supporting P1.-Appellee
at 35, Awad v. Ziriax, No-6273 (10th Cir. 2011).
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familiar with such statements. 112 Moreover, because Sharia lacks a legal
character, it was the only "non-legal content" that was subject to the
amendment. "' As a result, the amendment conveyed a message of
disapproval of the plaintiffs faith. 114
2. The Entanglement Prong
The district court in Awad found that the Oklahoma amendment
would foster excessive government involvement with religion." 5  In
order to comply with the amendment, the courts would have to determine
the content of Sharia. 16 This analysis, in turn, would force courts to
determine the content of the plaintiffs religious doctrines. 1'7  Such a
court-led venture into the content of the plaintiffs religion would be a
clear violation of the entanglement factor of the Lemon test."8  The
Supreme Court has established that it will not interfere in cases where it
has to decide whether a party deviated from its faith." 9 In addition, if
State Question 755 had been enacted, not only would Oklahoma courts
have had to determine what constitutes Sharia in Oklahoma, but courts
would also have had to make preliminary determinations about whether
the laws of other states contained elements of Sharia. 1
20
In its Establishment Clause analysis of State Question 755, the
district court noted that, by singling out Sharia, the state had in effect
singled out the plaintiffs religion. 121 By implying that the plaintiffs
religious beliefs were discouraged, the state was essentially promoting
other religions. The amendment conveyed "an official government
message of disapproval.'' 22  State Question 755 therefore failed the
endorsement test. 1
23
112. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 1195 (stating that the hypothetical observer
possesses a "certain level of information that all citizens might not share").
113. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 1306-07.
116. Id. at 1307.
117. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2dat 1307.
118. SeeLemonv. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
119. See Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment was
violated when a civil court determined the title to church property based on its
interpretation of church doctrine).
120. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2dat 1306-07.
121. Id. at 1306.
122. Id. at 1303.
123. Id. at 1306.
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3. The Purpose Prong
While the district court did not consider the purpose prong of the
Lemon test, the amendment fails to satisfy this prong because the
amendment does not have a secular legislative purpose. 124  It is not
enough for the state to claim a defense of a secular purpose at trial;
instead, in McCreary County v. ACLU,125 the Supreme Court noted that
the "secular purpose required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not
merely secondary to a religious objective." 126 In addition, the context of
the government action is relevant under the purpose prong.' 27 State
Question 755 fails to meet the purpose prong both on its face and in light
of the legislative history of the amendment. 128
First, the amendment singles out Sharia in its text.129 This plain
reading of the amendment leads to the conclusion that Sharia was a
specific target. Second, even if the state argues that the plain language of
the amendment should not determine the legislative purpose, the
amendment still fails to meet the Lemon standard of neutrality. The
legislative history clearly shows that Sharia was the primary target. 30
For example, State Representative Rex Duncan declared that State
Question 755 was a "preemptive strike against Sharia law."'
131
B. Free Exercise Clause
The district court in Awad also granted a preliminary injunction
because State Question 755 violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 132 The violations of rights that would have occurred under
State Question 755 were as flagrant as those rights advanced by the
ordinances in Lukumi.133 In addition, all of the ordinances were both
broad and underinclusive. 134 Unlike the law at issue in Smith,'35 the
124. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
125. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
126. 1d. at 864.
127. See id. at 874 (stating that the purpose "needs to be understood in light of
context").
128. See Brief of the Am. Jewish Comm. as Amici Curiae Supporting P1.-Appellee at
27-30, Awad v. Ziriax, No-6273 (10th Cir. 2011).
129. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
130. Amicus Brief, Awad v. Ziriax at 29, No-6273 (10th Cir. 2011).
131. Id.
132. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
133. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993)
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause was violated by ordinances that were neither
neutral nor generally applicable).
134. Id. at 546.
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Oklahoma amendment was neither generally applicable nor facially
neutral. 136 Accordingly, a court will strike down such a law unless it can
survive strict scrutiny analysis.137
Just as the ordinances in Lukumi exclusively targeted the Santeria
religion, 138 State Question 755 only targeted Sharia.139 The ordinances in
Lukumi included numerous exceptions for other religious groups and
practices.1 40  For example, the ordinances prohibited the killing of
animals for sacrifice but permitted kosher slaughter.14 1  In addition,
Ordinance 87-52' prohibited the possession, sacrifice, or slaughter of an
animal during a ritual if the intent was to eat the animal. 142  The
ordinance then exempted any licensed food establishment if zoning or
similar laws permitted the activity, effectively making the ordinance only
applicable to the Santeria religion.1
43
The Oklahoma amendment operated in a very similar fashion to the
ordinances in Lukumi. Sharia was the only religious doctrine mentioned
in the amendment; the remainder of State Question 755 forbade the use
of international law. 144 Only Muslims would be adversely affected by
the ban on Sharia. As Awad contended, the ban would inhibit his last
will and testament from probate because it was based on Sharia.
145
Awad would have the choice of either changing his will to remove all
religious and Islamic references or risk invalidation. 146 In addition, only
Muslims would be affected by the ban against consideration of laws of
another state if the state allowed consideration of Sharia. 147 There was
no equivalent language in the amendment banning the consideration of
laws from states that allowed international law or cultures. 
148
135. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated by the enforcement of a neutral
and generally applicable criminal prohibition).
136. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.
137. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
138. Id. at 525-26.
139. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (stating that the law was not facially neutral).
In addition, the amendment banned consideration of international law, but such a ban
does not affect a particular religious group the way that a ban on Sharia affects Muslims.
See id.




144. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1301 (discussing the text of State Question 755).
145. Id. at 1304.
146. P1.-Appellee Response Brief, Awad v. Ziriax at 46, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir.
2011).
147. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
148. See id.
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State Question 755 was neither facially neutral nor generally
applicable. 4 9 In fact, while it is arguable that the ordinances in Lukumi
were facially neutral,150 State Question 755 fails the test by explicitly
naming Sbaria. 5' Even if Oklahoma contended that the law was neutral
on its face, the court's inquiry would not have ended there; rather, the
Court in Lukumi declared that the Free Exercise Clause extends beyond
facial discrimination. 152 The Court in Lukumi noted, "[O]fficial action
that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded
by mere compliances with the requirement of facial neutrality.' 53
Therefore, the reviewing court would examine the effect of the
amendment upon the plaintiffs religion.1 54 As a result, the judge in
Awad would have found the amendment unconstitutional regardless.1 55
Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated. When a law is
not neutral, it is also unlikely to be generally applicable. 156 Having failed
the neutrality test, the amendment in Awad also fails the general
applicability test. State Question 755 was not generally applicable
because it named only Sharia and did not apply to any other religious
groups beside Muslims. 1
57
When seeking to regulate religious conduct, a law must not be
overbroad or underinclusive so as to disproportionally burden religion.1
58
In Lukumi, all of the ordinances were either overbroad or
underinclusive. 159 For example, two of the purposes of the ordinances
were to protect the public health and to prevent cruelty to animals.
60
However, as the Court pointed out, the Santeria could have accomplished
these purposes in a manner that fell short of a prohibition on all
149. See id.at 1301.
150. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533-34.
151. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (stating that the amendment may be viewed
as singling out Sharia law).
152. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 (stating that facial neutrality is not determinative).
153. Id
154. See id. ("[A]ction that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot
be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.").
155. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (stating that the amendment would have
prevented the plaintiffs will from being put into effect and may have prevented the
plaintiff from bringing actions in Oklahoma state courts for violations of the Constitution
if those violations were based upon his religion).
156. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
157. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (stating that the amendment singled out
Sharia law).
158. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543 (stating that the government cannot impose burdens
on religious beliefs in a selective manner).
159. Id. at 546.
160. See id. at 537 (stating that ordinance 87-40 incorporated the Florida animal
cruelty statute).
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sacrifices.16 ' Similarly, if State Question 755 was placed on the ballot to
prevent the consideration of foreign laws, this could have been
accomplished without singling out Sharia. For instance, the amendment
could have banned all cultural defenses or stated that no foreign law may
be considered. 1
62
When a law is neither facially neutral nor generally applicable, it
must pass strict scrutiny to be valid.1 63  To pass strict scrutiny, the
government must show a compelling state interest, and the law must be
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.164 In Lukumi, the Court said,
"[W]here government restricts only conduct protected by the First
Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct
producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest
given in justification of the restriction is not compelling."' 165 In other
words, a state cannot claim a compelling interest if it fails to prohibit
equivalent non-religious conduct. 1
66
Because most of the ordinances at issue in Lukumi were
underinclusive, no compelling state interest existed. 167 Furthermore, the
Court reasoned that even if there was a compelling state interest in
passing the ordinances, the ordinances were not drawn in sufficiently
narrow terms to accomplish those interests. 168 The judge in Awad found
that the Government presented no compelling state interest. 169 In fact,
members of the Oklahoma state legislature acknowledged that Oklahoma
courts had never used Sharia as a cultural defense. 1
70
Applying the Lukumi reasoning, even if Oklahoma had a
compelling state interest, the amendment would be unconstitutional
because it was overbroad and underinclusive.17' The amendment did not
mention any other religious doctrine nor did it ban other forms of cultural
161. See id. at 538 (noting that, if preventing improper disposal was the goal, it could
have been achieved by regulating garbage disposal).
162. An example of a neutral law is the ban in Smith. See Emp't Div., Dep't of
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (upholding a law banning the possession
of illegal substances); see also infra Part IV (attempting to formulate a neutral statute that
would survive strict scrutiny analysis).
163. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 ("A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive
treatment or advances legitimate governmental interest only against conduct with a
religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.").
164. See id.
165. Id. at 546-47.
166. See id.
167. ld. at 547.
168. Id.
169. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
170. Brief of the Am. Jewish Comm. as Amici Curiae Supporting PI.-Appellee at 37,
Awad v. Ziriax, No-6273 (10th Cir. 2011).
171. See Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 (stating that the amendment was not
narrowly tailored).
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defenses. 172 In addition, the purpose that the amendment purported to
serve-failing to recognize a foreign judgment when it went against
public policy-is arguably already served by courts. 17 3 Therefore, the
state presented no compelling state interest that justified passing the
amendment.
C. What if a Law Burdens Religious Practice?
The key to enacting legislation that could ban cultural defenses yet
pass First Amendment scrutiny may lie in the Supreme Court's decision
in Employment Division v. Smith. 174 Smith dealt with Native American
employees of an Oregon drug rehabilitation company who contended
that their dismissal from employment and subsequent loss of
unemployment benefits resulting from their use of peyote was
unconstitutional.175 The workers claimed that their use of peyote was for
religious purposes and that the law against peyote burdened their
religious practices. 76  In rejecting the Free Exercise claim of the
workers, the Court said, "We have never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate."' 77 The Court
noted that previous cases striking down laws as violating the Free
Exercise Clause involved "hybrid situations,"' 78 or circumstances in
which a state law burdened multiple constitutional rights. Here, there
was only a question of the Free Exercise Clause versus the right of the
state to regulate controlled substances. 179 In addition, the Court held that
strict scrutiny would not apply to neutral laws of general applicability,
even if they burdened religion. 80 Under this ruling, a neutral law of
general applicability would only have to meet rational basis review
regardless of how much it burdened religion."'
172. See id. (stating that the amendment singled out Sharia).
173. See P1.-Appellee Response Brief at 52, Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir.
2011) (arguing that a husband could not, for example, cite Sharia law in declaring that his
wife would receive no property after his death despite state intestacy laws).
174. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
175. See id.
176. Id. at 878.
177. ld. at 878-79.
178. Id. at 882; see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (holding
that licensing system for religious solicitations would violate both the Free Exercise and
Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234
(1972) (holding that requiring Amish children to attend school was a violation of both the
Free Exercise Clause and the rights of parents to raise children).
179. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, 882.
180. See id at 888.
181. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 1259. For example, Dean Chemerinsky
mentions that, after Smith, a priest would not be able to successfully challenge a state law
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Under the standard articulated in Smith, some federal circuit courts
have refused to strike down laws burdening religion because the laws are
neutral and of general applicability. 2 For instance, in 2001, the Tenth
Circuit ruled that the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act did not
violate the rights of Native Americans because it was a neutral law of
general applicability. 
8 3
A state would normally be within its power in banning cultural
defenses. s4  However, Sharia's unique nature as a religious doctrine
presents, a problem. Nevertheless, a law that is neutral and of general
applicability should survive judicial scrutiny even if it has the incidental
effect of burdening Muslims. While the Supreme Court will not strike
down a law for incidentally burdening religion,"15 the Court's inquiry for
neutrality goes beyond the face of the statute. 186 In addition to the text of
the bill, the legislative history of the statute must be void of any intent to
prohibit a particular religious practice. 1
87
In light of the requirements of both the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses, Part IV will describe a potential law banning cultural
defenses-including Sharia when used as such-that would survive
judicial scrutiny. Part IV attempts to describe a law that is not only
neutral and generally applicable but also one that has a secular purpose,
whose primary effect is not to inhibit or advance religion.
IV. A POSSIBLE STATUTORY SOLUTION
All Connecticut courts are prohibited from taking into consideration
the following during the sentencing of a criminal defendant: any
cultural defense designed to mitigate the defendant's culpability for
the offense. A cultural defense is any defense in which the defendant
claims that he or she should not be judged by the laws of the country
in which the crime occurred because the defendant was raised in a
different culture or follows different cultural norms. Culture is
defined as the attitudes, beliefs (including religious beliefs), or traits
of a particular social, economic, ethnic, or racial group. This statute
prohibiting the consumption of alcoholic beverages under the Free Exercise Clause, even
for communion. Id.
182. See CHEMERUNSKY, supra note 60, at 1259.
183. Id. at 1262.
184. The power to ban cultural defenses would fall under a state's "police powers."
See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (defining police powers as "an
exercise of the sovereign right of the government to protect the lives, health, morals,
comfort, and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under
contracts between individuals").
185. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 1259.
186. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(stating that facial neutrality is not determinative).
187. Id.
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does not affect the ability of the defendant to introduce at trial,
subject to the approval of the judge,188 any evidence that the
defendant feels is necessary to a proper defense.
This statute would likely survive Establishment Clause scrutiny
because it satisfies all three elements of the Lemon test.190 First, the
secular purpose of the statute is to protect the integrity of the judicial
system and to ensure that criminals are punished for their crimes.
Second, the primary purpose of the statute is not to inhibit a religion.
Finally, the statute would not involve excessive government involvement
with religion because it bans all cultural defenses. Thus, although
religious defenses are included in the statute, courts would not have to
determine the contents of any particular religion, thereby passing
constitutional scrutiny. 191
This statute would likely survive Free Exercise scrutiny because it
is both neutral and generally applicable. 192 A law that is neutral and
generally applicable must only satisfy rational basis review.' 93 Because
the law is neutral on its face, the state would only need to provide a
legitimate state interest. As previously noted, the interest would be to
uphold public policy regarding the judicial system and to insure that
criminals are adequately punished. This interest would be protected
under the broad police powers of the state. 194 If an individual wanted to
show that there was intent to discriminate, they would likely need
statements from the legislature or some other form of legislative history
that suggested such intent.19'
188. The judge will then determine whether to allow the evidence pursuant to the
state's rules of evidence.
189. This language is entirely from the author.
190. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In addition, the proposed
statute does not facially discriminate between two religions. See Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982).
191. Cf Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (holding that
State Question 755 would require judges to discern the content of the plaintiff's religious
beliefs).
192. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)
(holding that a neutral and generally applicable law would be constitutional even if it
burdened religion).
193. See CHEMERNSKY, supra note 60, at 1259.
194. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
195. Both the Lukumi and Awad cases included evidence of legislative intent to
discriminate against a particular religion. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525-28 (1992) (stating that the City held emergency meetings to
discuss action against the Santeria); Brief of the Am. Jewish Comm. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Pl.-Appellee at 35, Awad v. Ziriax, No-6273 (10th Cir. 2011).
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V. A STATE'S ATTEMPT AT OUTLAWING CULTURAL DEFENSES:
PENNSYLVANIA HB-2029
Contrast the statute in the preceding section with a proposed bill in
Pennsylvania. 196  The proposed Pennsylvania law, HB-2029, would
prohibit Pennsylvania tribunals from considering any foreign legal code
or system which "does not grant the parties affected by the ruling or
decision the same fundamental liberties, rights and privileges granted
under the United States Constitution and the Constitution of
Pennsylvania."' 197  Although HB-2029 would likely survive Larson
scrutiny because it does not facially discriminate among religions, 198 the
bill would have difficulty overcoming the Lemon test. 199 While HB-
2029 has a provision asserting that no tribunal shall adjudicate a claim if
it will violate the Establishment Clause,200 this provision is not likely to
protect the bill from a constitutional attack under the purpose and
entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. 20 1 Like the legislative history of
State Question 755, the legislative history of HB-2029 mentions Sharia
several times.20 2 In addition, courts will need to determine what
constitutes a religion in order to enforce HB-2029. This type of inquiry
will require courts to pass judgment on religious beliefs, a practice that
the Supreme Court explicitly admonishes. °3 In contrast, the statute
proposed in the previous section survives entanglement prong scrutiny
because it bans all cultural defenses.
VI. CONCLUSION
While states are free to ban the use of cultural defenses in
courtrooms, and should ban them in criminal cases, states must be
careful when attempting to ban Sharia as a cultural defense. Sharia is
unique in that it is a religious doctrine. 2°4 Therefore, it falls under the
protection of the First Amendment. To survive First Amendment
196. H.B. 2029, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2011-12 (Pa. 2011).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
200. The provision states that no tribunal or arbitrator would be required to
"adjudicate an ecclesiastical matter if adjudication would violate the establishment clause
of the First Amendment of the United States." H.B. 2029.
201. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
202. Randy LoBasso, Sharia Law Bill Declared Unconstitutional in OK, What Does
That Mean for PA Legislation?, PHILADELPHIA WEEKLY BLOG (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://bit.ly/zfkpPn (discussing the mention of Sharia in a legislative memo).
203. See Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
204. AHDAR & ARONEY, supra note 28, at 3.
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scrutiny, any law attempting to outlaw Sharia as a cultural defense must
survive both an Establishment and Free Exercise Clause analysis.
To pass Establishment Clause scrutiny, the law would need a
secular purpose, the primary effect of which is not to inhibit or advance
religion, and be one that would not involve an excessive government
entanglement with religion.20 5 To survive Free Exercise Clause scrutiny,
the law would have to be neutral and generally applicable.20 6 If the law
is not neutral and generally applicable, the government would need to
show that there is a compelling state interest and that the law is narrowly
207tailored to achieve such purpose. As this Comment's proposal
suggests, a state may ban the use of Sharia as a cultural defense.
However, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the ban must be motivated
by the desire to eliminate cultural defenses in general, not by a desire to
attack any particular religion.
205. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
206. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
207. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1992).
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